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It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over centu-
ries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who had "been
excluded from the American dream for so long, "... constituted the first
legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abol-
ish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy.'
INTRODUCMON
A century ago, Justice Harlan 2 insisted-in vain at the time-that
the Constitution "neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."3
This short but powerful phrase offers a perfect illustration of the
changing context of equality-based constitutional claims. Responding
to the political and social setting in which the state treated African
Americans as naturally unequal and appropriately subjugated, Justice
Harlan's rebuke of the majority in Plessy v. Ferguson was surely a warn-
ing about a missed opportunity for expanding freedom. 4 Eliminating
this official subjugation by the imposition of a standard of official
color-blindness would have been a move toward liberation in 1896; it
certainly proved to be one-half a century later.5 Nevertheless, read in
the context of our own time, the phrase highlights the very complexity
of equality jurisprudence. Today, one might respond to Justice
t Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. AKB. 1986, Princeton Uni-
versity; J.D. 1990, Harvard Law School.
t- Law Clerk to the Honorable DennisJacobs, United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. AB. 1992, Radcliffe College, Harvard University; J.D. 1997, Harvard Law
School.
I United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) (quoting 110 CoNG. Rzc.
6552 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey)).
2 This was the first Justice John Marshall Harlan who served on the United States
Supreme Court from 1877 to 1911; the second Justice John Marshall Harlan (a grandson
of the first) served from 1955 to 1971. See Wistzm B. LOCKHART ETr AL, CONSTrTTONAL
LAW: CAsEs-CoMMENTs-QuEsrlONS 1554 (8th ed. 1996).
3 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4 In Pessy, the Supreme Court articulated the doctrine of "separate but equal," thus
laying the groundwork for decades of state-sponsored segregation and oppression. See id.
at 548-52.
5 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954) (rejecting the doctrine of
separate but equal in the face of manifest inequality in segregated public schools).
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Harlan that the problem is that the Constitution does not know classes
among citizens and therefore tolerates them in life, if not in law.
In a distortion of Justice Harlan's reading,6 the Supreme Court
increasingly has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause as a mandate
for the state to treat citizens as if they were equal-as a limitation on
the state's ability to draw distinctions on the basis of characteristics
such as race7 and, to a lesser extent, gender.8 To the extent that the
targets of feminists and civil rights lawyers took the form of state-spon-
sored, identity-based subjugation, such as male-only juries and Jim
Crow laws, the Court's move toward this interpretation has served us
relatively well.9 Moreover, for the first two decades following Brown v.
Board of Education, the color-blindness approach was qualified by the
Court's acceptance of benign race-conscious measures.10 This two-
tiered review of racial classifications permitted the government to de-
velop policies that address more subtle forms of discrimination.
These efforts have taken the form of affirmative action strategies such
as set-aside programs, race- and gender-specific scholarships, hiring
preferences, and voter redistricting plans, among others."
6 AlthoughJustice Harlan stated that "[no] legislative body or judicial tribunal may
have regard to the race of citizens when the civil rights of those citizens are involved,"
Pessy, 163 U.S. at 554-55 (Harlan, J., dissenting), his concern went beyond mere color-
blindness to the elimination of caste. See id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("In respect of
civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.").
7 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204-05 (1995) (striking
down minority preference system in government contracts).
8 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996) (striking down male-
only admissions policy at state-run military college).
9 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) ("We hold that
gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality.");
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 678-79 (1973) (striking down statutory provision
discriminating against servicewomen's spousal benefits); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-77
(1971) (striking down state probate code discriminating against women when appointing
administrators of estates); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (striking down state
statutory ban on miscegenation); Brown, 347 U.S. at 493-95 (striking down state laws per-
mitting or requiring racial segregation in public schools). But see Michael M. v. Superior
Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469-76 (1981) (plurality opinion) (upholding state statute criminaliz-
ing only statutory rape by men).
10 See infra notes 35-47 and accompanying text (discussing cases).
11 This effort began on the federal level over three decades ago with the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 5, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 (1994)). More recent
federal legislation has included the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-
3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)), and
the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1902 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). On the state and
local level, examples include reforms of domestic violence and sexual assault statutes. See,
e.g., Domestic Abuse Act, MnN. STAT. ANN. § 51813.01 (West Supp. 2000) (reforming stan-
dards for the issuance of orders for protection of victims of domestic violence).
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These gender- and race-specific policies are now very much
threatened by the Court's narrowing conception of equal protection.
In the context of race, the Court has struck down not only race-spe-
cific policies designed to harm the historically oppressed, but race-
conscious policies designed to foster racial equality.12 Although in
theory the Court has left open the possibility that benign uses of race
may be constitutional under some set of facts, in practice it has yet to
identify such a policy since it adopted strict scrutiny across the
board.'13 In its equal protection analysis of gender, the Court has also
moved toward a stricter level of scrutiny, calling into question the pos-
sibility of benign uses of gender as well.14 As the Supreme Court nar-
rowed the scope of benign race-based categories permitted by the
Constitution, political forces have launched attacks on affirmative ac-
tion policies at both the state and federal levels.
These legal and political developments have reinvigorated the de-
bate in the legal literature as to whether the Equal Protection Clause
requires, permits, or forbids the use of race-conscious state policies
intended to promote racial equality. Some commentators, perhaps a
minority, have argued that the Equal Protection Clause should be
read to require the use of race-conscious policies when necessary to
eradicate or remedy the most serious consequences of racial inequal-
ity.15 Others have argued that such policies, though not required,
12 See infra notes 35-48 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's recent equal
protection cases).
13 Justice O'Connor insisted in Adarand that the standard is not "'strict in theory, but
fatal in fact.'" Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (quoting Fulli-
love v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J, concurring)). However, the Court
has not upheld a racial classification since Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547
(1990), overuled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), the last case to
apply a more lenient standard to benign racial classifications. See Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at
563-66.
14 See Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1657, 1675 (1997)
("[TIhe Supreme Court has moved increasingly toward an interpretation of equal protec-
tion as a guarantee of neutral treatment by the state with respect to ... gender. In other
words, the Equal Protection Clause guarantees that the state will treat citizens as individu-
als rather than as part of... gender-defined groups." (footnote omitted)). But see Denise
C. Morgan, Finding a Constitutionally Permissible Path to Sex Equality: The Young Women's Lead-
ership School of East Harlem, 14 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HuM. Rrs. 95, 101-13 (1998) (arguing that
United States v. Virginia would permit a gender-conscious policy with sufficient showing of
remedial purpose).
15 See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. Rv.
1060, 1062 (1991) (arguing that "we are not currently a colorblind society, and that race
has a deep social significance that continues to disadvantage blacks and other Americans
of color" and concluding that "in order to make progress in ending racial oppression and
racism, our political and moral discourse must move from colorblindness to colorcon-
sciousness, from antidiscrimination to racial justice"); cf CA-MAR-NE A. MACKINNON, Differ-
ence and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FmviNisM UNMODFED: DlscouRSES ON LIFE
AND LAw 32, 42 (1987) ("[I]f differentiation into classifications, in itself, is discrimination
... the use of law to change group-based social inequalities becomes problematic, even
1196 [Vol. 85:1194
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should be permitted when duly adopted by the majority of the popu-
lace to promote the interests of an historically oppressed minority.16
Still others, including now a majority of the Supreme Court, take the
view that the Constitution forbids virtually all explicit uses of race by
the state.17
In this Essay, we do not enter this debate directly. Rather, we
attempt to explore the reasons behind the increasing acceptance of a
norm of color-blindness-both politically and legally-and locate
those reasons within a particular liberal conception of the limited,
neutral state. We then attempt to demonstrate that the movement
toward an increasingly strict view of discrimination as simply color-
consciousness has not been limited to the equal protection context.
We see a parallel move in the regulation of private discrimination
under Title VII: a move from the view that Title VII requires, or at
least permits, race-conscious actions to a view that the antidiscrimina-
ton imperative in Title VII requires color-blindness on the part of
private employers. This development in Title VII doctrine has at
times been explicit; but more often it has been implicit, only apparent
as a shift in assumptions about the meaning of employer conduct and
the prevalence of identity-based discrimination. In the last section of
the Essay, we challenge this parallel evolution of the doctrine in these
two areas by arguing that many of the reasons for a color-blindness
standard in the context of state action are simply irrelevant or inco-
herent when applied to the regulation of private conduct.
I
EQUALIY AND THE LBERAL STATE
In this Essay, we do not take a position on the interpretive legiti-
macy or historical correctness of the equality-as-group-blindness inter-
pretation of the Equal Protection Clause. Instead, we suggest that this
view is consistent with and rooted in-though perhaps not required
by-a particular liberal conception of the relationship between the
individual and the state. In this section, we explore this relationship
contradictory.... [I]n view that equates differentiation with discrimination, changing an
unequal status quo is discrimination, but allowing it to exist is not.").
16 These arguments have come in several different variations, but they all support the
recognition of a right to equality that goes beyond an antidiscrimination rationale. See,
e.g., CAss R SuNsmIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 338-46 (1993) (articulating an anticaste
principle for understanding equality); ROBIN WEsT, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RE-
CONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 20-30 (1994) (stressing the protective aspect
of the Equal Protection Clause).
17 See Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 227 (holding that "all racial classifications, im-
posed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a review-
ing court under strict scrutiny").
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to lay a foundation for our argument in Part MI regarding the regula-
tion of state versus private power.
Liberal individualist principles have shaped the evolution of our
constitutional doctrine as well as our shared conception of what it
means to live in a democracy.' Though variously formulated, the
central principles that characterize that discourse include the notions
that individuals, and not groups, are the primary political units and
bearers of rights;19 that equality means, first and foremost, the right of
every individual to "equal respect and concern" in pursuit of her con-
ception of the good;20 and that the state should not adopt any sub-
stantive conception of the good, but remain neutral among
competing conceptions. 21 Underlying these three principles is the as-
sumption that the individual is a fully self-determining, freely choos-
ing subject.
So stated, these principles do not seem to have much to say about
the formation and status of groups, such as the family, the commu-
nity, or other subgroups within civil society. Indeed, critics have cited
this inattention to the situatedness of the individual as an important
limitation of our liberal democratic structure.2 2 We contend, how-
ever, that the principles of autonomy and neutrality as embodied in
our constitutional framework actually have a great deal to say about
the politics of group identity. In fact, one could argue that difference,
18 Perhaps the best support for this assertion comes from those who have argued over
the last decade that we have all but ignored the republican roots of the Constitution. See,
e.g., MICHAELJ. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DIscoNTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOS-
oPHY 5-7 (1996) (describing republican theory as a rival public philosophy that liberalism
displaced); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1494 & nn.4-5 (1988) (con-
sidering "how contemporary American constitutional understanding and analysis might
benefit from serious and sympathetic ... reflection upon the civic-republican strain in
political thought").
19 See, e.g., RONALD DwomNq, TAKING PRGHS SERIOUSLY 180 (1977) ("We might say
that individuals have a right to equal concern and respect in the design and administration
of the political institutions that govern them." (emphasis added)); John Rawls, Kantian
Construdivism in Moral Theory, 77J. PHIL 515, 543 (1980) (describing the individual "citi-
zens" as the only "self-originating sources of valid claims").
20 DwoRKIN, supra note 19, at 182; see also id. (describing "a natural right of all men
and women to equality of concern and respect, a right they possess not by virtue of birth or
characteristic or merit or excellence but simply as human beings with the capacity to make
plans and give justice").
21 See, e.g., JoHN RAWLs, POLTICAL LIBERALISM passim (1993) (advocating a political
conception ofjustice designed to establish the rules of social cooperation among individu-
als with divergent ideas of the good).
22 This criticism has come both from those who locate themselves within liberalism
and from those outside. For an example of the former, see SUSAN MOLLER OIN, JusrICE,
GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 7-8 (1989) (criticizing the inattention of contemporary theorists
ofjustice to the relationship between the individual and the family, particularly the gender
implications of that relationship). For an example of the latter, see SANDEL, supra note 18,
at 6 (criticizing liberal political theory's disregard for the relationship between the individ-
ual and the community, particularly the implications of that relationship for democratic
decision making).
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including difference defined by group identity, is a central animating
force behind our constitutional commitment to autonomy and neu-
trality. Viewed in this way, the problem is not silence with respect to
group status or questions of identity, but the particular message con-
veyed by our liberal commitments.
To be more precise, many proponents of a limited, neutral state
regard it as the innovation that permits democratic self-governance
under conditions of cultural, moral, and religious diversity.23 By
maintaining both the neutrality and the thinness of the state, this con-
ception simultaneously preserves social order and individual free-
dom.24 According to this standard defense of liberalism, differences
among citizens or groups of citizens within the polity justify-indeed
require-a limited, neutral conception of state power.2 5 In a sense,
difference, and the inevitable disagreement it yields, is the problem to
which the liberal state is the solution. The solution, in turn, is accom-
plished by defining difference as irrelevant to the public self, the citi-
zen, and relegating it to the realm of the private. As Wendy Brown
explains, "in a smooth and legitimate liberal order, if the particularis-
tic 'I's' must remain unpoliticized, so also must the universalistic 'we'
remain without specific context or aim, without a common good other
than abstract universal representation or pluralism."26 Any incursion
of group identity into the realm of the political is viewed with suspi-
cion. In the public sphere, "we" are undifferentiated citizens, sharing
equally in our liberties and participating equally in collective self-gov-
ernment, with our differences conveniently relegated to the private
23 For example, Rawls asks, "[H]ow is it possible for there to exist over time ajust and
stable society of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?" RAwIs, supra note 21, at 4. For Rawls and
others, the answer is political liberalism. See id.
24 This is more than an argument for liberalism as modus vivend, a set of institutions
designed to mediate among individuals pursuing their private interests. Rather, the argu-
ment captures an idealism centered on enlightenment or self-realization through auton-
omy. See, e.g., George Kateb, Democratic Individuality and the Claims of Politics, 12 PoL.
THEORY 331, 332 (1984) (making an even stronger claim for fostering what he calls demo-
cratic individuality).
25 As Nancy Rosenblum explains, "where diverse and rival interests and opinions (and
moral justifications) are inescapable, liberalism prescribes a framework of institutions and
procedures to break the violence of faction, asJames Madison instructed, by bringing them
into the frame of government." Nancy L. Rosenblum, Introduction to LIBEmAuSM AND THE
MORAL LIFE 6 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989).
26 WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY' POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODnaNrn" 57
(1995). In a similar move, Chantal Mouffe describes how Rawls's "notion of 'reasonable
pluralism'" separates permissible differences that can flourish in the private sphere from
unacceptable pluralism that "would jeopardize the dominance of liberal principles in the
public sphere." Chantal Mouffe, Democracy, Power, and the "Political," in DEMOCRACY AND
DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BouNDARIEs OF THE PoLrrlcAtL 245, 249 (Seyla Benhabib ed.,
1996).
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realm.2 7 In short, the problem of difference is resolved through its
privatization.
The liberal state is not inevitably hostile to the recognition of
identity-based groups, or even to the assignment of rights based on
group identity. Although historical and contemporary liberal thinkers
have often viewed such groups as a threat to the polity,28 it is possible
to articulate liberal democratic justifications for group-conscious
measures designed to foster substantive equality. Such policies might
explicitly address identity-based differences bearing on inequality in a
way that is fully consistent with a commitment to individual auton-
omy.2 9 For example, a race-conscious measure such as the Voting
Rights Act can be justified on the grounds of expanding individual
autonomy through equal participation in the democratic process. It is
also possible to accommodate within liberalism claims for special
rights based on the distinctness of groups.3 0 For example, granting
autonomy to ethnic or national minorities such as Native Americans
can be defended on liberal, individualist grounds of self-
determination.3 '
More often, however, liberal thinkers consider the policies neces-
sary to simultaneously respect difference and achieve substantive
equality as entailing unacceptable departures from the core liberal
values of autonomy and state neutrality. They view the assignment of
rights based on group status, however justified in the particular, as a
violation of the abstract principles of equal citizenship. This view has
been particularly influential within the American political experience,
27 Brown goes further, arguing that "the social relations iterating class, sexuality, race,
and gender would appear to be individualized through rights discourse, ascribed to per-
sons as attribute or internal content rather than social effect." BROWN, supra note 26, at
115. In other words, in a liberal political order, difference is not merely privatized, but
naturalized.
28 See, e.g., JOHN STuART MILL, Considerations on Representative Governmen in UTiLrrR-
AN IsM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIvE GOVERNMENT 171, 361 (Ernest Rhys ed.,J.M. Dent &
Sons 1910) (1861) (arguing that "[a]mong a people without fellow-feelings, especially if
they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the work-
ing of representative government, cannot exist").
29 Indeed, many liberals advocate such policies, defending them as essential to a thick
conception of citizenship that forms the foundation to liberal democracy. See, e.g., Jfirgen
Habermas, Multiculturalism and the Liberal State, 47 STAN. L. REv. 849, 849 (1995) (asking,
"Should citizens' identities as members of ethnic, cultural, or religious groups publicly mat-
ter, and if so, how can collective identities make a difference within the frame of a constitu-
tional democracy?").
3o For an interesting argument defending the recognition of rights of self-determina-
tion for national minorities, see WILL KymLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL
THEORY OF MINORm RIGHTs 75 (1995) (arguing that "respecting minority rights can en-
large the freedom of individuals, because freedom is intimately linked with and dependent
on culture").
31 See id. at 38-40 (discussing the group-based claims of Native Americans under the
U.S. Constitution).
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and it is not difficult to see why. The definition of individual particu-
larity as irrelevant to political personhood is a direct reaction to domi-
nation effected through the assignment of political privilege
according to that particularity. This is precisely the type of regime
Justice Harlan criticized in Plessy. Freedom or liberty in this context
has understandably come to be defined as the discounting of private
inequality in the name of universal citizenship.
The most frequently cited articulation of this principle is the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education.3 2 In Brown,
the Court rejected the separate but equal doctrine in public educa-
tion.33 The Court was highly sensitive to the context and social mean-
ing of segregated schools; it recognized both the profound material
and symbolic inequality of the system and the connection between
that inequality and the racial subordination that the Equal Protection
Clause was intended to address.3 4
Over the decades that followed, however, the Supreme Court has
increasingly disregarded the context of Brown and has come to see the
decision as endorsement of a standard of color-blindness. Relying on
this misreading of Brown, the Supreme Court has embraced the idea
that the problem addressed by the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection is not group-based inequality, but rather its official recogni-
tion.35 For example, in the area of voting rights, the Court warned in
Shaw v. Reno36 that " [r]acial gerrymandering, even for remedial pur-
poses, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to
carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no
longer matters-a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire."3 7 This
warning contains two important points: First, identity-based groups
are dangerous to the Nation; they threaten to balkanize us into com-
peting factions. Second, official recognition of the existence of such
groups through race-conscious districting will reify that harm. With
the threat thus characterized, the appropriate approach for the state
is to ignore the issue and to close its eyes to the racial pattern.
In the Court's view, state acknowledgment of collective identity is
threatening not only to the polity, but also to the individual. For ex-
32 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
33 See id. at 495.
34 See id. at 494 (noting that separating children "solely because of their race gener-
ates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone").
35 See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995) (citing Brown-albeit with a
"see also" signal-for the proposition that the central mandate of the Equal Protection
Clause is "racial neutrality in governmental decisionmaking").
36 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
37 Id. at 657.
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ample, in Miller v. Johnson,38 the Court characterized the view that in-
dividuals of the same race share a single political interest as "'based
on the demeaning notion that members of the defined racial groups
ascribe to certain "minority views" that must be different from those of
other citizens."39 In other words, the harm is the insult to the indi-
vidual that stems from the official assumption that group-based char-
acteristics define the individual. The Court defined state-sponsored
discrimination not in terms of oppression but stereotyping-the mis-
taken assumption that difference matters.
This conception of equal protection perhaps found its clearest
articulation injustice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of Cal-
ifornia v. Bakke.40 Justice Powell explained: "If it is the individual who
is entitled to judicial protection against classifications based upon his
racial or ethnic background because such distinctions impinge upon
personal rights, rather than the individual only because of his mem-
bership in a particular group, then constitutional standards may be
applied consistently."41 In contrast to the contextualized-and there-
fore complex-formulation of "discrete and insular minority," this
construction has the advantage, in Justice Powell's view, of formal
equality.42 The "insult" of being judged on the basis of group identity
can, in theory, be visited equally on all-black or white, male or fe-
male. Defined this way, the state's equal protection obligation is fully
consistent with a commitment to equal concern and respect for all
citizens.
When the harm of discrimination is so defined, the solution lies
not in policies geared toward substantive equality (or even meaningful
equality of opportunity), but rather in group-blindness. This solution,
in turn, is consistent with a liberal emphasis on the individual as
rights-bearer and political actor. This liberal ideal has informed the
Supreme Court's application of equal protection principles. Dissent-
ing in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,43 Justice O'Connor argued that
"[a] t the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies
the simple command that the Government must treat citizens 'as indi-
viduals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or na-
38 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
39 Id. at 914 (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 636 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting)).
40 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
41 Id. at 299.
42 See id. (noting that "constitutional standards may be applied consistently" (emphasis
added)).
43 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995).
1202 [Vol. 85:1194
2000] AGENCY, EQUALITY, AND ANTDISCRIMINATION LAW 1203
tional class.'"44 Five years later, Justice O'Connor's was the majority
view. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,45 she wrote:
[T]he basic principle [is] that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution protect persons, not groups. It follows from
that principle that all governmental action based on race-a group
classification long recognized as "in most circumstances irrelevant
and therefore prohibited" . . . -should be subjected to detailed
judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal protection
of the laws has not been infringed.46
In sum, in its interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, the
Court has gradually embraced a norm of group-blindness, defined
from the state's point of view. Differences among groups will surely
persist (or, in the language of liberal pluralism, "flourish") in the pri-
vate sector. This is to be both celebrated as a product of the free
choices of self-determining individuals and sometimes regretted as an
unfortunate consequence of that freedom. The liberal state, however,
must regard individuals as equal, indeed interchangeable, for pur-
poses of public citizenship, the allocation of public resources, rights,
and democratic participation. As the Court stated succinctly in Miller
v. Johnson, the Fourteenth Amendment's "central mandate is racial
neutrality in governmental decisionmaking."47
We summarize this familiar doctrinal evolution and its liberal
roots not so much to criticize it (though we are tempted), but to ar-
gue for its limitation. Specifically, we suggest that the liberalism-in-
spired move toward a group-blindness standard is dictated by a
particular view of the relationship between the state and its citizens.
This standard has no necessary application to the regulation of private
discrimination; nevertheless courts have increasingly adopted it in
that context as well.48 In the next Part, we trace the encroachment of
a group-blindness approach into the doctrinal development of Title
VII. Then in Part III, we sketch our preliminary argument regarding
44 Id. at 602 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax
Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1083 (1983)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
45 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
46 Id. at 227 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
47 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995).
48 Consider Justice Scalia's concurrence in Adarantd. Although he endorsed a color-
blind standard, he linked it to the state's point of view:
Individuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination
should be made whole; but under our Constitution there can be no such
thing as either a creditor or a debtor race. That concept is alien to the
Constitution's focus upon the individual .... In the eyes of government, we are
just one race here. It is American.
Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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the distinction between the regulation of public and private action
with respect to race or other identity-based categories.
II
DIFFERENCE AND THE REGULATION OF PRIVATE CHOICE
Race consciousness-or consciousness of the connection among
race, employment decisions, and segregation of the workplace-moti-
vated Congress to enact Title VII and has shaped the development of
the statute's doctrine.4 9 As the House Report stated, the goal of Title
VII was "to eliminate, through the utilization of formal and informal
remedial procedures, discrimination in employment based on race,
color, religion, or national origin,"50 with sex subsequently added to
the list. Later employment discrimination laws, such as the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act5 ' (ADEA) and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 199052 (ADA), shared similar goals.
Consistent with this purpose, the standards of liability and avail-
able remedies under Title VII have, from the outset, reflected a con-
sciousness of group status or identity. In some circumstances, courts
have interpreted Title VII as obliging race-conscious action by employ-
ers, prompting, for instance, the development of hiring standards that
reflect an awareness of their effect on the racial composition of the
work force.55 In other circumstances, courts have permitted employ-
ers to use race-conscious strategies for constructive purposes, such as
adopting voluntary affirmative action plans.54 Even in the individual-
ized disparate treatment context, the case law has implicitly recog-
49 In United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), the Supreme Court held more
specifically that "Congress' primary concern in enacting the prohibition against racial dis-
crimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was with 'the plight of the Negro in
our economy.'" Id. at 202 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 6548 (1964) (statement of Sen.
Humphrey)).
50 H.R. REP. No. 88-914, pt. 1, at 26 (1963).
51 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
52 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
53 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-36 (1971) (allowing plaintiffs
to challenge under Title VII facially neutral hiring practices that have a disparate impact
on identifiable protected groups).
The Reagan and Bush Administrations pointed to the imposition of race conscious
standards in disparate impact litigation to insist that Title VII promoted hiring quotas;
President Bush vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 on this basis. See Ian Ayres & Peter
Siegeliman, The Q-Word as Red Herring. Why Disparate Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring
Quotas, 74 TEx. L. Rav. 1487, 1489 (1996); Martha Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equal-
ity Under Title VI: Disparate Impact Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA
L. Ray. 305, 309 (1983). Nevertheless, the argument that Title VII obliges employers to be
conscious of the racial impact of hiring criteria does not lead to the conclusion that such a
standard promotes quotas.
54 See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979) (holding that Title
VII permits voluntary affirmative action by employers that is consistent with the purposes
of the statute).
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nized the impossibility of a race-blindness standard for evaluating
employer decision making.55 Yet in each of these areas, courts have
increasingly moved toward a standard of group-blindness or employer
neutrality toward race as defining the antidiscrimination norm. This
doctrinal movement toward group-blindness or employer neutrality
has restricted the ways in which an employer might constructively con-
sider race in developing hiring policies, and has ignored the inevita-
bility of race consciousness in individualized employment decisions.
This Part analyzes examples that illustrate this doctrinal development.
A. The Decline of Disparate Impact
Disparate impact doctrine is the area of federal employment dis-
crimination law that most directly emphasizes group identity and its
relationship to employment patterns. The relevant harm under a dis-
parate impact theory is the measurable differential effect of an em-
ployer's hiring practice on a particular protected group. The simple
idea behind this doctrine is that employment practices that dispropor-
tionately disadvantage or exclude members of certain groups must be
eliminated unless justified by business necessity. Employers are re-
sponsible for the removal of such barriers whether or not they were
erected for exclusionary purposes. So defined, disparate impact doc-
trine imposes an obligation on employers to act with a consciousness
of race and to design hiring and promotion procedures that will mini-
mize the exclusion of particular racial groups. The standard is one of
neutrality of impact, not neutrality of intent.
In the first two decades after the passage of Title VII, many com-
mentators believed that disparate impact cases would eventually as-
sume a greater role than disparate treatment cases in ending
employment discrimination. 56 They believed that courts had ad-
dressed the most egregious disparate treatment cases during the dec-
ade following passage of Title VII, thus creating an opportunity for
courts to turn to more subtle forms of discrimination.57 However, this
opportunity did not materialize with any force. Plaintiffs still bring
the vast majority of Title VII cases under a disparate treatment theory,
while disparate impact cases have become exceedingly rare.
The decline of the disparate impact theory can be traced to a
movement away from the standard first set out by the Supreme Court
in Criggs v. Duke Power Co.58 In Ciggs, the Court held that an em-
55 See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981)
(discussing the function of the burden-shifting framework).
56 See, eg., Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and
the Concept ofEmploynent Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. Rr.v. 59, 62-63 (1972); Chamallas, supra
note 53, at 310-12.
57 See Chamallas, supra note 53, at 310 & nn.20-21.
58 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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ployer's facially neutral employment practices could violate Title VII if
the practices negatively affected a disproportionate number of people
in a protected group and the employer could not prove that the prac-
tices were necessary to achieve a legitimate business goal.59 Accord-
ingly, the Court did not require disparate impact plaintiffs to prove
discriminatory intent. Instead, they could prevail by establishing a
clear pattern of group-based discriminatory impact that was not justi-
fied by business necessity.60 This standard forced employers to tailor
employment criteria narrowly with an awareness of their race or gen-
der implications. Under this standard, employment criteria had to
"measure the person for thejob and not the person in the abstract."61
The Court's subsequent decisions have gradually increased the
plaintiffs burden of proof in disparate impact cases; neutrality of im-
pact is now measured according to the specific employment criteria,
rather than the broader discernable impact on the employer's work
force.62 Under this standard, plaintiffs must prove the specific tech-
nique of discriminatory practices; plaintiffs cannot just identify the
consequences and expect the employer to explain the practice on
business grounds. Moreover, plaintiffs can no longer rely on the pro-
portion of minorities in the general population as a baseline for mea-
suring disparate impact. Instead, plaintiffs must calculate the racial
composition of "the qualified ... population in the relevant labor
market."63
This has proven to be a difficult standard to meet in the lower
courts. For example, in Vitug v. Multistate Tax Commission,64 a Filipino
plaintiff attempted to show that his former employer's "word-of-
59 See id. at 431.
60 See id. at 432. The Court explained that "good intent or absence of discriminatory
intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as
'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability."
Id.
Some commentators have noted that this heightened standard for disparate impact
actually blurs the line between disparate impact and disparate treatment cases. See Ayres &
Siegelman, supra note 53, at 1491-94.
61 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436.
62 See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989); Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he plaintiff's bur-
den in establishing a prima facie case goes beyond the need to show that there are statisti-
cal disparities in the employer's work force.... [T]he plaintiff is in our view responsible
for isolating and identifying the specific employment practices that are allegedly responsi-
ble for any observed statistical disparities."); see also Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L.
Wiliborn, Deconstructing Disparate Impact: A View of the Model Through New Lenses, 74 N.C. L.
REv. 325, 346 & n.55 (1996) ("The Supreme Court... [made] clear that it is part of the
plaintiff's burden to indicate the particular screening level that produces the disparate
impact. Evidence of a disparate impact at the bottom line, without more, is insufficient to
make out a prima facie case.").
63 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977).
64 88 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996).
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mouth recruitment and subjective interview evaluations directly re-
sult[ed] in a disproportionate failure to hire or promote Asian or
Catholic applicants." 65 The Seventh Circuit, however, found that the
plaintiff had failed to establish even a prima facie case of disparate
impact because the plaintiffs expert witnesses had not identified a
specific employment criterion that resulted in any statistical dispar-
ity.66 Instead, the plaintiffs experts had found that the overall hiring
practice was a poor indicator of a candidate's ability, introduced arbi-
trariness into the recruiting process, and permitted favoritism. 67 The
court rejected this evidence: "[The expert's] conclusions ... support
only the inference that [the employer]'s selection process is subjec-
tive-at worst, that it is arbitrary and unreliable. But arbitrariness
alone does not amount to discrimination." 68 In short, the Vitug court
acknowledged that the employment practice was unnecessary and
problematic, but refused to credit the plaintiff's link between the
practice and the collective experiences of Catholics and Asians.
Even when a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disparate
impact, courts have become more willing to accept explanations other
than discrimination for unequal hiring practices. For example, de-
fendants have been increasingly successful in raising a "lack-of-inter-
est" defense. Under this defense, employers claim that statistical
disparities in employment reflect patterns of individual choice rather
than unfair hiring practices. In perhaps the most notorious example,
Sears successfully argued that gender segregation in its work force was
a result of women's preference for lower risk, lower paying, noncom-
mission sales jobs.69 Professor Vicki Schultz has thoroughly docu-
mented employers' use of such defenses and courts' responses to
them in sex discrimination cases from 1972 to 1989.70 Her results,
viewed from the perspective of our analysis, confirm the judicial trend
toward further narrowing disparate impact causes of action. In lack-
of-interest defense cases, courts are willing to see group-based employ-
ment patterns. However, rather than ascribe those patterns to dis-
crimination, courts naturalize them by attributing them to individuals'
free exercise of private choice. Courts characterize the employer's ac-
tions as neutral in intent, though not in outcome, and the unequal
hiring pattern as a by-product of group differences for which the em-
ployer is not responsible.
65 Id. at 513.
66 See id. at 513-14.
67 See id. at 514.
68 Id.
69 See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
70 See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARv. L.
Ruv. 1749 (1990).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
B. Modifying the Burden-Shifting Framework
In the disparate treatment context, the move toward a color-
blindness or employer neutrality standard is more subtle but no less
significant. From the outset, litigation of disparate treatment cases
has reflected the reality that individual employment decisions are vir-
tually never race or gender blind. The Supreme Court acknowledged
as much in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green71 by developing a burden-
shifting framework for these cases based on an individual plaintiffs
group status. 72 Under this framework, a disparate treatment plaintiff
could prove discrimination either by offering direct evidence of dis-
criminatory intent, or by establishing that her employer had treated
her less favorably than members of other groups and had provided a
pretextual explanation for that treatment.73 In other words, it was
enough for a plaintiff to show that she had been treated differently
and that the employer had lied about the reason for this treatment.
From this evidence, the fact finder could reasonably conclude that the
plaintiff had been the target of illegal discrimination.
The McDonnell Douglas framework was premised on a particular
assumption about the prevalence of discrimination and the realization
of the difficulties faced by plaintiffs in proving discriminatory intent.
If a plaintiff could show that she was treated unfavorably, the court
would look to the employer for an explanation of the reasons behind
that treatment. If the employer then provided a false explanation, the
fact finder could reasonably conclude that the false explanation was a
pretext for illegal discrimination. 74 Over the past decade, several cir-
cuit courts have chipped away at the McDonnell Douglas framework,
holding that disparate treatment plaintiffs must provide direct evi-
dence of impermissible employer discrimination in addition to show-
ing employer pretext.75 This "pretext-plus" modification to the
burden-shifing framework reflects a move away from the basic as-
71 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
72 See id. at 802-05.
73 See id.; see also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256
(1981) ("The plaintiff... may succeed... either directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.").
74 In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993), the Supreme Court held
that a Title VII plaintiff who proved that an employer's reason was pretextual was not
necessarily entitled to judgment. See id. at 509-11. Hicks establishes that evidence in addi-
tion to pretext might be required to meet the plaintiffs burden of persuasion. The case,
however, does not support the pretext-plus approach as described below.
75 Currently, the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits explicitly follow a
pretext-plus approach. See Hidalgo v. Overseas Condado Ins. Agencies, Inc., 120 F.3d 328,
335-37 (1st Cir. 1997); Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332, 1337-40 (2d Cir. 1997) (en
banc); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836-38 (8th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Rhodes v.
Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 994-95 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc);Jiminez v. Mary Wash-
ington College, 57 F.3d 369, 377-78 (4th Cir. 1995).
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sumptions about the prevalence of discrimination. Courts adopting
this approach are simply less willing to conclude that a showing of
disparate treatment, coupled with an employer's pretextual explana-
tion, establishes a claim of discrimination.
Although the terminology can be rather technical, the debate in
the courts over pretext can easily be translated into a question of the
meaning ascribed to an employer's apparently group-based choices
coupled with misrepresentation or obfuscation of those choices.
When an employer rejects a qualified African-American applicant in
favor of a white applicant and then offers an explanation for the deci-
sion that is implausible, misleading, or deliberately false, what conclu-
sion should the fact finder be permitted to draw? Under the original
McDonnell Douglas approach, in a slim majority of circuit courts,76 the
plaintiff can today survive summary judgment either by offering direct
evidence of discriminatory intent, or by showing that the employer's
explanation is false. These courts assume that, by giving a false or
implausible rationale for the hiring decision, the employer may be
attempting to conceal impermissible race-based hiring practices.
Thus, they generally consider evidence of such falsehood sufficient to
support a finding of discrimination. 77
In contrast, pretext-plus courts require additional direct evidence
of discrimination from the plaintiff, beyond any evidence of false-
hood, to survive an employer's motions for summary judgment or di-
rected verdict. In effect, the difference between pretext-plus and
pretext-only courts is rooted in background assumptions about the
prevalence of discrimination and about whether an employer's
pretextual explanation is an attempt to conceal that discrimination.
For example, in Fisher v. Vassar College,78 the Second Circuit re-
versed a district courtjudgment that Vassar College had violated Title
VII and the ADEA when it denied tenure to a married female biology
professor over the age of forty.79 The Second Circuit agreed with the
district court that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of
discrimination and had shown that some of the College's assertions
76 Currently, the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits
generally follow a pretext-only approach, at least when considering motions for summary
judgment. See Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1044-47 (7th Cir. 1999); Aka v.
Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Arington v. Cobb County,
139 F.3d 865, 875 (11th Cir. 1998); Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d
1061, 1066-72 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc); Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 451-53
(10th Cir. 1995); Huguley v. General Motors Corp., 52 F.3d 1364, 1370-72 (6th Cir. 1995);
Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1993).
77 See, e.g., Aka, 156 F.3d at 1290 (rejecting "[a] reading of Hicks under which employ-
ment discrimination plaintiffs would be routinely required to submit evidence over and
above rebutting the employer's stated explanation in order to avoid summary judgment").
78 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc).
79 See id. at 1333-34.
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about her qualifications-the alleged nondiscriminatory reason for
the denial of tenure-were false.80 However, the en banc court fol-
lowed the earlier panel decision in finding that the plaintiffs showing
of pretext "'points nowhere."' 8' In coming to this conclusion, the
Second Circuit did not consider the College's pretext in relation to
the plaintiffs group status. Specifically, it did not consider the infer-
ences that could be drawn from the fact that the College lied about a
member of a group that had historically been denied tenure-older,
married women. Nor did the court consider the inferences that could
be drawn from the College's more favorable treatment of other
groups. Rather, the court focused simply on whether the plaintiff had
provided any direct evidence of discrimination aimed at her as an in-
dividual. When the court found that the plaintiff had not, it con-
cluded that no reasonable fact finder could have found discrimination
and reversed the lower court verdict.82
Pretext-plus courts have similarly disregarded plaintiffs' group
status even when considering policies explicitly addressing group
membership. In Hidalgo v. Overseas Condado Insurance Agencies, Inc.,8 3
for example, the First Circuit granted summary judgment for an em-
ployer who sent the plaintiff a letter asking him to retire on his sixty-
fifth birthday, "[ i] n accordance with the company's established guide-
lines." 4 The plaintiff told his employer that he did not intend to re-
tire on that date.85 Approximately three months later, the employer
informed the plaintiff that his division would cease to exist as of the
date of his sixty-fifth birthday and that his contract would not be ex-
tended after that date.8 6 The plaintiff once again informed his em-
ployer of his desire to continue working, but the employer refused.
The plaintiff subsequently filed an ADEA case against the employer,
and the employer eventually moved for summary judgment.8 7
In a pretext-only court, the Hidalgo plaintiff most likely would
have survived the employer's motion for summaryjudgment. Indeed,
the Hidalgo court assumed that the plaintiff had established a prima
facie case of discrimination: (1) the plaintiff was in the class of per-
sons protected by the ADEA (persons over forty years of age); (2) he
was qualified for the position at issue; (3) his contract was not ex-
tended; and (4) his work continued to be performed by younger em-
ployees even after his division was eliminated and his contract was
80 See id. at 1344-45.
81 Id. at 1345 (quoting Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420, 1437 (2d Cir. 1995)).
82 See id. at 1347.
83 120 F.3d 328 (1st Cir. 1997).
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allowed to lapse.88 The Hidalgo court also assumed, with hesitation,
that the employer's proffered reasons for firing the plaintiff-that the
plaintiff's division was closed because it was unprofitable and that cus-
tomers had complained about plaintiff's interpersonal skills-were
pretextual, given evidence in the record contradicting the employer's
assertions.8 9 Both of the court's assumptions seem reasonable. The
employer sent the plaintiff a letter asking him to retire because of a
company policy specifically aimed at those employees reaching sixty-
five years of age; the employer did not announce its intention to close
plaintiff's division or discuss the division's lack of profitability until
plaintiff refused to retire; and the division's work, including plaintiffs,
was reassigned to other, younger employees. 90 Moreover, plaintiff in-
troduced evidence indicating that, prior to receiving the employer's
letter, all of his performance reviews were more than satisfactory and
that he had never been informed of the alleged complaints against
him.91 A pretext-only court likely would have found that this evidence
was sufficient to allow the plaintiff to take his case to the fact finder to
determine whether the employer was motivated by discriminatory
intent.
The Hidalgo court, however, granted summary judgment for the
employer; it found that the plaintiff had not submitted sufficient evi-
dence to indicate that the employer's pretext masked discriminatory
intent.92 In reaching this decision, the court almost entirely ignored
the factual basis the of the plaintiffs prima facie case. The court did
not think that the employer had treated the plaintiff, an older worker,
differently from other workers. Rather, the court focused on the evi-
dence submitted by the plaintiff to refute the employer's stated rea-
sons for the adverse employment action. Despite the letter asking the
plaintiff to retire at age sixty-five, the court found that the plaintiff
"offered no evidence that reasonably could be construed to indicate
that [the employer] intended to discriminate against him because of
his age."93 The court stated that the letter only indicated the em-
ployer's expectation that its employees retire at age sixty-five and
therefore was not "significantly probative.., or even minimally suffi-
cient... circumstantial evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find
discriminatory animus on [the employer's] part."94 Although the em-
ployer's policy targeted a group to which the plaintiff belonged, and
the employer lied to the plaintiff when he refused to follow that pol-
88 See id at 332-38.
89 See id. at 337.
90 See id. at 336.
91 See id. at 336-37.
92 See id. at 338.
93 Id. at 337.
94 Id. at 337-38 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
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icy, the pretext-plus court found that there could be no finding of
discrimination because the plaintiff did not submit evidence of dis-
crimination specifically directed at him as an individual.95
Contrary to the purpose of the original burden-shifting frame-
work, such cases ignore the fact that employers are aware of factors
such as race, gender, or disability, when they make employment deci-
sions. For example, in suggesting that the plaintiff's showing of pre-
text "points nowhere" in Vassar,96 the Second Circuit acknowledged
that Vassar College might have lied. Nonetheless, it agreed with the
earlier panel decision that such lies were not evidence of discrimina-
tion because there was no direct evidence linking the lies to the plain-
tiff's group status. As the court stated, "[i]ndividual decision-makers
may intentionally dissemble in order to hide a reason that is non-dis-
criminatory but unbecoming or small-minded, such as back-scratch-
ing, log-rolling, horse-trading, institutional politics, envy, nepotism,
spite, or personal hostility."97 The court did not consider how such
small-mindedness or personal hostility might be affected by the fact
that the plaintiff was a member of a group that had historically been
denied tenure. Rather, the court seemed content with the possibility
that the College's pretext could mask a variety of personal weaknesses
other than group-based treatment.
In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., the Supreme Court
recently rejected the most extreme version of the pretext-plus ap-
proach-that a plaintiff's prima facie case plus a showing of pretext is
insufficient to support a finding of discrimination as a matter of law.98
On the other hand, the Court stopped short of holding that such a
showing necessarily entitles a plaintiff to survive summary judgment.
Indeed, the Court cited Vassar as an example of a situation where sum-
mary judgment was appropriate. Thus, Reeves appears to leave sub-
stantial latitude for lower courts to express their skepticism toward
allegations of discriminatory intent.
Courts' willingness to credit motivations other than discrimina-
tion for an employer's pretextual explanation of a hiring decision ac-
cords with courts' acceptance of a lack-of-interest defense in disparate
impact cases. In both types of cases, courts are increasingly willing to
regard employers' decisions as neutral with respect to group-based
characteristics such as race or gender and to view the seemingly iden-
tity-based consequences of those decisions as resulting from nondis-
criminatory or color-blind factors. The doctrinal trend is toward
95 See id.
96 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
97 Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332, 1337 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc).
98 See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., No. 99-536, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 3966,
at *26-27 (June 12, 2000).
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accepting formally neutral decisions at face value and viewing in-
stances of discrimination as anomalous and irrational.
C. Voluntary Affirmative Action
The changes described above in both the disparate impact and
disparate treatment doctrines reflect a reluctance by courts to view
facially neutral policies as discriminatory, even when they affect em-
ployees in a seemingly gender- or race-specific way. At the same time,
courts have become increasingly vigilant with respect to another type
of departure from neutrality by employers-voluntary affirmative ac-
tion. Recent cases imposing limitations on voluntary affirmative ac-
tion reinforce the notion that the antidiscrimination standard
embodied in Title VII is a standard of group-blindness or employer
neutrality. Moreover, it is in this area that the courts' language has
come most closely to parallel equal protection doctrine.
In United Steelworkers v. Weber,99 the Supreme Court held that vol-
untary affirmative action programs in private employment were per-
missible under Title VII.100 The Court noted that the primary
purpose behind Title VII was to expand economic opportunities for
African Americans; it held that "an interpretation of [Title VII] that
forbade all race-conscious affirmative action would 'bring about an
end completely at variance with the purpose of the statute' and must
be rejected."' 0 Under Weber, employers' affirmative action plans were
legitimate so long as "[t]he purposes of the plan mirror[ed] those of
the statute"'0 2 and did not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of the
white employees.' u0 3 The plan in Weber, which involved hiring goals,
on-the-job training, and race-based hiring preferences for new train-
ees, was upheld by the Court under this standard.10 4
In Johnson v. Transportation Agency,105 the Court applied the Weber
standard to approve a public employer's affirmative action plan in
which gender was one factor in the selection of candidates for tradi-
tionally male-dominated positions. 10 6 The Court also addressed the
distinction between the Title VII standard and the equal protection
99 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
100 Voluntary affirmative action plans are those undertaken by an employer other than
in response to a court order or Tite VII suit. In this sense, they are not strictly remedial
and need not entail an admission by the employer of past wrongdoing. See id. at 200; see
also id- at 210-11 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (expressing concern that, without voluntary
affirmative action, employers walk on a "'tightrope'" between admitting past violations and
preventing future ones).
101 Id. at 202 (citation omitted).
102 Id. at 208.
103 Id.
104 See i& at 208-09.
105 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
106 See id. at 641-42.
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standard. It held that, although the equal protection standard was
higher,10 7 the Title VII standard applied equally to both public and
private employers and operated independently of the equal protec-
tion standard.'08
Notwithstanding the clear language in Johnson, lower courts have
increasingly collapsed the two standards, effectively limiting the scope
of voluntary affirmative action by private employers under Title VII.
For example, in Taxman v. Board of Education,10 9 the school board of
Piscataway, New Jersey, eliminated a teaching position from the busi-
ness department." 0 In order to provide racial diversity in an all-white
department, the school board decided to retain an African-American
teacher over an equally qualified white teacher."' The white teacher,
Taxman, sued the school board, alleging that its actions had violated
Title VI. 112 The Third Circuit agreed with Taxman, holding that the
affirmative action plan discriminated against her because the plan was
nonremedial and involved a layoff.113 In reaching this conclusion, the
Third Circuit interpreted the scope of affirmative action permitted
under Title VII very narrowly, limiting it to only those situations when
necessary to remedy past discrimination." 4 In applying this standard,
the court came much closer to the strict scrutiny color-blindness ra-
tionale the Supreme Court adopted in Wygant"15 and reaffirmed in
Adarand,116 than the more flexible Title VII approach in Weber and
Johnson."'7
107 See id. at 627 n.6. The equal protection standard seems to be higher in most re-
spects. See Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(holding that strict scrutiny applies to racial categories under the Equal Protection Clause
even when the classification benefits minorities). However, to the extent that diversity sur-
vives as a justification for racial classifications under Bakke the Equal Protection Clause
might permit some types of affirmative action forbidden under recent interpretations of
Title VII. SeeTaxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1550 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that "a
non-remedial affirmative action plan, even one with a laudable purpose, cannot pass
muster").
108 SeeJohnson, 480 U.S. at 628 n.6 (noting that "[ t ]he fact that a public employer must
also satisfy the Constitution does not negate the fact that the statutory prohibition with
which that employer must contend was not intended to extend as far as that of the Constitution"
(emphasis added)).
109 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996).
11o See id. at 1551.
III See id. at 1551-52.
112 See id. at 1552.
113 See id. at 1563-65.
L14 See id. at 1557-58.
115 See supra note 107.
116 See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
117 The implications of the Taxman holding for the future of voluntary affirmative ac-
tion by private employers are not clear. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Taxman,
see Piscataway Township Bd. of Educ. v. Taxman, 521 U.S. 1117 (1997), but due to the
encouragement from civil rights groups who feared that the Court would adopt the Third
Circuit reasoning, the school board reached a settlement prior to oral argument, see Piscat-
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Together, the Third Circuit's approach in Taxman, the Second
Circuit's pretext-plus analysis in Vassar College, and the Seventh Cir-
cuit's acceptance of the lack-of-interest defense in EEOC v. Sears illus-
trate a broader trend in Tide VII litigation. Courts are increasingly
willing to tolerate a range of questionable but facially group-blind ex-
planations for employment decisions that disadvantage minorities and
women. At the same time, courts are becoming less tolerant of any
explicit use of racial preferences by employers regardless of the justifi-
cation. This pattern parallels the Supreme Court's changing ap-
proach to equal protection, moving away from a contextual analysis of
inequality and toward a purely formal color-blindness standard. In
both types of cases, the Court now considers the principal harm to be
acknowledging race rather than perpetuating inequality.
DI
LBERALM AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TrrLE VII AND
EQUAL PROTECTION
In Part I, we suggested that, in constitutional interpretation, the
Supreme Court's standard of group-blindness seems motivated by a
powerful commitment to state neutrality toward group status; that
commitment, in turn, stems from underlying liberal principles. The
notion that all citizens are equal in the eyes of the state is coupled
with the concern that if the state notices or takes account of differ-
ence, it risks reifying difference, and hence inequality. Put differently,
the color-blindness norm is premised on the notion that there is harm
in state recognition of identity. In Part II, we argued that courts are
extending the norm of color-blindness, though often subtly and im-
plicitly, to the analysis and regulation of private acts of discrimination.
Relying in part on the distinction between public and private uses of
difference, we shall argue in this Part that this extension of the stan-
dard is inappropriate.
Whatever the problems with the Supreme Court's embrace of a
standard of group-blindness in its interpretation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, this doctrinal development does not require acceptance
of such a standard in the regulation of private conduct. This is true
both as a legal matter and as a conceptual matter. First, as a matter of
constitutional law, nothing in the Equal Protection Clause requires
the state to regulate private conduct by imposing its standard on pri-
away Township Bd. of Educ. v. Taxman, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997) (dismissing certiorari). For
a discussion of Taxman and the distinction between Title VII and equal protection ap-
proaches to affirmative action, see Mary E. Westby, Comment, Taxman v. Board of Educa-
tion: 77e Conflation of Equal Protection and Title VH Standards in Affirmative Action. 1998 UTAH
L. REV. 331, 333-50.
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vate decision makers. 118 For example, notwithstanding Adarand, there
would be no equal protection objection to a statute awarding prefer-
ences to government contractors whose work force mirrors the racial
or gender composition of the relevant labor pool, or even the local
population." 9 Similarly, there would be no equal protection objec-
tion to a federal statute permitting an employee to establish a claim of
discrimination against his employer based on an adverse employment
decision, coupled with a showing of generalized racial imbalance in
the employer's work force.' 20 Both policies would be group-blind
from the standpoint of the state, since they treat all groups in a for-
mally equal way and draw no explicit lines on the basis of race or
gender. That they require race-conscious recruitment and training
on the part of private contractors does not violate the group-blind
norm as applied to state actors.
This observation raises the more difficult conceptual question: To
what extent is a group-blind norm appropriate in the regulation of
private conduct? A complete answer to this question is beyond the
scope of this Essay. Nevertheless, we offer a partial answer by arguing
that the conception of group-blindness on the part of the state, which
underlies the Court's equal protection jurisprudence, does not sup-
port such a norm in the private realm. Instead, the court must theo-
rize a separate standard of group-blindness or employer neutrality
toward race in the private context by taking into account both a range
of factors that distinguish the private from the public and the goals of
antidiscrimination legislation.
In Part I, we identified two important justifications for the group-
blindness standard articulated by the Supreme Court in the context of
equal protection: (1) a vision of public citizens as undifferentiated
and equal before the law, with differences relegated to the private
sphere,12' and (2) a commitment to state neutrality with respect to
group identity.122 Recalling examples from Part II which demonstrate
118 See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 627 n.6 (1987) (distin-
guishing between Title VI, which Congress intended to track constitutional standards and
adopted pursuant to its Section 5 power, and Title VII, which Congress directed at purely
private conduct and passed pursuant to its power under the Commerce Clause).
119 In Adarand, the challenged program targeted socially and economically disadvan-
taged individuals, but created a presumption that members of certain minority groups fell
within the scope of that definition. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
208-09 (1995).
120 Indeed, this standard comes close to the disparate impact standard that the Court
articulated in Griggs, but subsequently limited. Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 431-32 (1971) (accepting general statistics regarding the racial composition of the
work force), with Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1989) (requir-
ing a more specific statistical showing regarding the racial composition of the qualified
applicant pool).
121 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
122 See supra notes 21, 23-25.
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how these principles have been translated to the private sphere, we
attempt to show the inappropriateness of the group-blindness stan-
dard under Title VII and argue for the necessity of group-conscious-
ness within the private sphere.
A. Public Citizen and Private Choice
Translating the concept of the undifferentiated public citizen to
the private workplace leads to a view of the workplace as a public,
neutral sphere where differences are irrelevant or emerge only as an
expression of private preference. This view is already reflected in the
increasing skepticism of courts towards claims of discrimination as ex-
planations for unequal hiring patterns or disparate treatment of indi-
viduals. 123 Courts have imposed a heavy burden on plaintiffs, both in
disparate impact and disparate treatment cases, to show precisely how
their injury-from not being hired, not being promoted, being paid
less, or being denied tenure-was due to their difference and not to
some suspect, but nonetheless legally acceptable, reason or mere hap-
penstance. 12 4 Moreover, courts are increasingly accepting alternative,
nondiscriminatory explanations of suspect employment patterns pre-
mised on the operation of difference through private choice.125 This
doctrinal development assumes that individual preferences pre-exist
interaction between the employer and the labor force and that the
employer is not responsible for shaping or even responding to those
preferences. In this sense, cases involving the lack-of-interest defense
parallel the Supreme Court's assumption in the equal protection con-
text that difference is prior to politics. The analysis substitutes the
employer for the state, but otherwise remains the same: difference re-
sults from the expression of private preferences; the employer is not
complicit; and the remedy is neutrality.
Despite the parallel structure of the analysis and the ease with
which courts have adopted it, any doubts one might harbor about the
possibility of truly color-blind government policies are magnified in
the context of private employment decisions. In statewide or nation-
wide policy decisions reflected in legislation, racial or gender implica-
tions may be deliberately veiled, incidental, or genuinely
unintended. 126 No such doubt exists with respect to the group-con-
123 See supra Part H (discussing parallel trends in disparate treatment and disparate
impact cases).
124 See supra notes 75, 78-97 and accompanying text (discussing the pretext-plus ap-
proach in disparate treatment cases).
125 See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text (discussing the emergence of the lack-
of-interest defense in disparate impact cases).
126 This view has prompted the Supreme Court to require a plaintiff to show defen-
dant's discriminatory intent to prevail in an equal protection challenge. See, e.g., Personnel
Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278-80 (1979) (holding that incidental effect on a protected
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scious character of private employment decisions. First, every individ-
ual employment decision is made with an awareness or perception of
the candidate's race and other group characteristics-a perception
that is always burdened with entrenched notions about racial and
group differences. Second, even with generally applicable, facially
neutral employment criteria, employers can reasonably be expected
to consider the racial or gender implications of the criteria. Indeed,
this expectation informs the Supreme Court's recognition of a dispa-
rate impact theory in Griggs. Third, the requirements for private em-
ployment are "thick," or more detailed, as opposed to the thin
requirements of public citizenship: the employer attempts to distin-
guish among candidates based on sometimes subtle characteristics rel-
evant to the job. Hence, differences among individuals are not
relegated to a remote private sphere, but necessarily become a part of
the equation. The decision maker's assumptions, whether conscious
or not, about the connection between those job-related characteristics
and race or gender inevitably come into play.127 This personal, indi-
vidualized decision-making process belies the presumption of equality
(or "sameness") and places difference squarely in the foreground.
Given that employment decisions are impossible to evaluate using
a group-blindness standard, is it reasonable to impose a requirement
of employer neutrality with respect to race and group identity? We
argue that the answer is no. Such a standard is meaningless (or almost
impossible to prove) in a necessarily group-conscious decision-making
process. This is true whether the burden is placed on the plaintiff to
prove the precise role of race or group identity against a presumption
of group-blindness, or on the employer to prove the absence of race
as a factor in the decision. The difficulties that plaintiffs in pretext-
plus courts have had in proving discriminatory intent illustrate the
former;128 Taxman illustrates the latter.' 29 When the Taxman school
board eliminated one job, it had to choose between two equally quali-
fied teachers-one white and one black.'30 The school board could
not deny the knowledge of the candidates' race; the decision was
made with awareness of this difference. The school board had two
options under the Third Circuit's view: either admitting that it had a
group is insufficient to demonstrate discriminatory purpose); Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-68 (1977) (holding that proof of ra-
cially discriminatory intent is necessary to establish a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248-52 (1976) (rejecting a disparate impact
theory in an equal protection claim).
127 For an explanation and examples of how stereotyping affects employees' workplace
standing, see Devon Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CoRELL L. REv. 1259
(2000).
128 See supra Part II.B.
129 See Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996).
130 See id. at 1551-52.
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record of racial discrimination and therefore its affirmative action
plan was remedial, or tossing a coin.13s The first option is obviously
problematic for the school board. The second option is equally prob-
lematic in view of the purposes of antidiscrimination law. If employ-
ers who are confronted with the reality of a racially diverse labor force
and a societal history of discrimination are compelled to act as if race
never matters, they can only aspire to apparent, but false, neutrality.
The goal of equality will remain out of reach.
B. Neutrality, Freedom, and Private Employment
Liberal theorists have commonly linked arguments for state neu-
trality, including color-blindness, to the preservation of individual
freedom and autonomy. As discussed in Part I, this view requires neu-
trality on the part of the state to ensure the full scope of individual
self-determination within the private sphere.13 2 As with the subordi-
nation of difference already discussed, translating this principle to the
sphere of the private employer is also problematic for at least two rea-
sons. First, theorists have thoroughly contested the degree to which
state neutrality is possible.133 Yet, as problematic as the concept of
state neutrality may be, demarcating the limits of power is even more
difficult in the context of the private employer. The workplace itself is
an environment for which the employer is fully responsible. Though
regulated in a myriad of ways to protect workers, the workplace is gov-
erned by the employer's economic purposes and interests. Indeed,
the doctrinal evolution of workplace regulation has recognized the
scope of employer control over the workplace. Title VII doctrine
makes an employer responsible for the discriminatory conduct of its
employees in situations in which the employer knew or should have
known about the conduct. 34
Second, imposing a standard of employer neutrality toward
group identity does not serve the goal of expanding individual liberty
in the workplace, even in the narrowest sense of expanding employ-
ment opportunity. Employment opportunities are always shaped by
131 See id. at 1567 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting) (restating the question presented as
"whether Title VII requires a... school board ... to make its decision through a coin toss
... or whether Title VII permits the school board to factor into the decision its bona fide
belief.., that students derive educational benefit by having a Black faculty member in an
otherwise all-White department").
132 See supra notes 21, 23-25.
133 See, e.g., Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1
(1992); Symposium, Mediating Institutions: Beyond the Public/Private Distinction, 61 U. Cm. L.
REv. 1213 (1994); Symposium, The Publi/PivateDistinction, 180 U. PA. L. REv. 1289 (1982).
134 See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 801-08 (1998) (holding an
employer vicariously liable for the harassing actions of a supervisor based on the em-
ployer's control of the conditions of the workplace and the allocation of power among
employees).
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group-based factors fully outside the employer's control-factors
which operate to the advantage of some workers and to the disadvan-
tage of others. At most, we can expect the employer to respond to
such factors in a constructively group-conscious way. Moreover, the
private workplace has invoked the language of freedom more often to
justify the preservation of management prerogatives than to recognize
liberties of individual workers.
CONCLUSION
The doctrinal evolution of Title VII jurisprudence in recent years
has increasingly converged with that of the Equal Protection Clause,
specifically in its embrace of a color-blindness standard. In the con-
text of constitutional limits on state action, a liberal understanding of
the relationship between the individual and the state has informed
the Supreme Court's adoption of color-blindness as a standard for
measuring the constitutional obligation of equal protection. This
standard, controversial in the sphere of state action, is even more
problematic in the context of private employment decisions necessar-
ily made with knowledge of race and the group dynamics of the work-
place. Unfortunately, the continued unreflective acceptance of color-
blindness in the interpretation of Title VII is likely to undermine the
power of the statute to accomplish the goals that motivated its enact-
ment: meaningful equality within a racially diverse workplace.
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